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Abstract
Incentive misalignment in rewards-based crowdfunding occurs because creators may benefit disproportionately from fundraising, while backers may benefit
disproportionately from the quality of project deliverables. The resulting principal-agent relationship means
backers rely on campaign information to identify signs
of moral hazard, adverse selection, and risk attitude
asymmetry. We analyze campaign information related
to fundraising, and compare how different information
affects eventual backer satisfaction, based on an extensive dataset from Kickstarter. The data analysis uses a
multi-model comparison to reveal similarities and contrasts in the estimated drivers of dependent variables
that capture different outcomes in Kickstarter’s funding
campaigns, using a linear probability model (LPM),
which is a special case of the binary probability model.
Our results reveal inconsistencies in funding information compared to backers’ satisfaction, and a platform-wide trend of decreasing satisfaction. The findings
broadly suggest fundraising is influenced by information disclosure and backer feedback, while eventual
backer satisfaction is closely potentially caused by information about deferred compensation and long-term
relationship-building.

1. Introduction
Crowdfunding platforms have become a popular
means of launching new ventures, bringing together
large crowds of potential investors (hereafter termed
backers) around projects. The global crowdfunding
market was valued at US$13.9 bn in 2019 and is predicted to triple by 2026 [31]. Crowdfunding allows creators to access critical funding, while also helping them
to find others with whom they share common interests
[6]. Entrepreneurs (hereafter termed creators) are increasingly turning to crowdfunding, and not traditional
financiers, because a well-executed crowdfunding campaign can help to create a strong community of backers
for a new venture even before it is presented to the
broader public [29]. So, entrepreneurs (hereafter termed
1
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creators), are turning to crowdfunding not traditional financiers, with a global crowdfunding 2025 market of
US$28.8 bn predicted.
The benefits of crowdfunding depend on projects receiving the resources they need. This explains why existing crowdfunding research has put emphasis on the
fundraising process. Fundraising is only the first step.
Once backers have committed the required funds, creators must deliver on the promises of the project. Yet rewards-based crowdfunding, where backers donate in return for future rewards, typically requires full downpayment by backers often months or even years in advance of the intended project outcomes. 1
The arrangement between creators and backers is
something mainstream management theory considers
naïve. Crowdfunding platforms create natural conditions for goal, information, and risk asymmetries,
though there is little formal governance to manage the
resulting agency problem. Instead, backers must trust
that creators have the skills and benevolence to act in
their shared interests. Existing research has spent considerable effort exploring how creators build crowdfunding campaigns with characteristics to generate this
trust [24]. However, that research has not addressed
whether the trust generated by these characteristics is
deserved. This is an oversight, due to an incentive misalignment that disproportionately rewards creators for
attracting funds, even if they do not generate positive
outcomes for backers.
Our study explores the problem of incentive misalignment in rewards-based crowdfunding. We performed a review of the rewards-based crowdfunding literature to identify campaign characteristics that predict
fundraising success. We used a data-gathering process
that yielded 377,778 fundraising campaigns from Kickstarter. They support comparisons of campaigns according to fundraising and eventual backer satisfaction. Our
results show characteristics that predict fundraising,
counterintuitively, do not predict backer satisfaction.
More worryingly, several exhibit negative correlations,
which require that we assess the robustness of the estimated models, and limitations in our empirical design.

This is like a down-payment contract that assumes high trust [16].
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We also show trends toward increasingly effective fundraising, but decreasing backer satisfaction, and decreasing platform activity.

2. Intellectual foundations for crowdfunding
and incentive misalignment
We next discuss several bodies of knowledge from
Strategy, Economics, Management, Accounting and IS
that offer intellectual foundations for this research.

2.1. Rewards-based crowdfunding
Crowdfunding platforms connect commercial, social, and artistic projects with potential backers, affording them an alternative to traditional sources of financing, such as banks or venture capitalists [27]. Different
platforms facilitate different types of crowdfunding.
Some focus on interest-based loans, and others on purchase of equity or donations [2]. Rewards-based crowdfunding has produced disruptive outcomes, from cultural projects to new technologies though.
Rewards-based crowdfunding appeals to creators
and backers for a variety of reasons. It allows mutuallybeneficial short-term financial benefits – creators get
revenue at a time of need, and backers get valuable discounts or assets. Crowdfunding also can contribute to
viral marketing and generate interest among potential
consumers and user groups. And some backers and creators believe the grass-roots approach is more likely to
create shared value with wide-ranging social benefits
[18]. Policy-makers encourage the growth of these platforms, building on evidence that crowdfunding campaigns boost innovation [32], stimulate local economies,
and create opportunities for entrepreneurs [20].
These benefits assume crowdfunded projects can deliver their promised rewards. This has been controversial though. Many commentators have demonstrated
why crowdfunding projects disappoint backers, with the
risk of fraud [10], inexperience or poor planning creating delays or unforeseen problems [30], and systemic
coordination and communication challenges as projects
grow in size [22]. All of these assume creators are at
fault. However, it is also possible backers are disappointed because of unrealistic expectations, or because
they misunderstood the intentions of the project. 2
Crowdfunding differs from other forms of
crowdsourcing in two notable ways. First, the crowd in
crowdfunding platforms do not usually participate directly in the co-creation process. Instead, they entrust
2

The threat of backers becoming dissatisfied is not only a problem for
projects. It may harm crowdfunding platforms as a whole, if backers
become disillusioned over time. For instance, platform-wide funding
activity may decrease when individual campaigns are suspended [10].
3
An agent takes actions and make decisions to reflect the interest of
an invested principal in the presence of some information asymmetry.

design and development to the creator, limiting the role
of backers to onlookers who only make suggestions
[15]. Second, the crowd must commit their support to a
project at the outset, not when they are satisfied with the
project’s outcome. So, they are committing to risky outcomes subject to change.

2.2. The incentive-misalignment problem
This type of arrangement is a principal-agent relationship. 3 It creates conditions wherein the goals of the
principal and agent diverge and the principal has limited
means to verify the agent is acting appropriately. Eisenhardt [11] notes three related issues: (1) moral hazard,
where the agent can pursue opportunistic and selfish behaviors invisible or poorly understood by the principal
(2) adverse selection, where the agent presents to the
principal as being more capable than they actually are;
and (3) risk attitude asymmetry, where the principal and
the agent may prefer contrasting actions because they
are impacted differently by risk.
Rewards-based crowdfunding is susceptible to incentive misalignment. A fundraising campaign is a contract of sorts, but backers cannot negotiate specific commitments with creators. They provide funding at the project start and have little legal ability to enforce penalties
or rewards once the campaign is underway. 4 A counterargument suggests this structure is not problematic
though. Backers and creators are invested in the desirability of the project. However, previous management research suggests that when principals lack the ability to
monitor agents’ activities, the sharing of short-term benefits may have an adverse effect [26]. It may encourage
agents to use the principals’ resources to maximize
short-term earnings. 5
A benefit for creators is the ability to gauge demand
for subsequent products and services, rather than make
premature long-term commitments [2]. Backers lack
this ability, as they have already committed their resources. This leaves them at the mercy of creators,
should the latter choose to leverage the backers’ funds
for maximum short-term gain.
Crowdfunding makes creators focus disproportionately on fundraising (which may not impact backers, if
a project has met its targets) and backers to focus on outcome quality (which may not benefit creators). So how,
then, can principal-agent relationships deal with incentive misalignment? We consider four strategies.

It allows the agent to hide certain actions and information.
4
This is true even if creators have delivered rewards, and backers are
upset with the quality, timeliness, customer support, and discounts
relative to subsequent consumer releases [4].
5
Agents can walk away from a long-term relationship, so they weigh
short-term benefits and long-term costs / risks, which is not abstract.
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2.3. Contracts, disclosures, and compensation
A basic means to address these issues is to align the
incentives between principals and agents, so each works
toward the same outcomes [26]. Principals, first, do this
with a contracting strategy. They allocate some or all of
the reward to an agent, based on adherence to some behaviors and outcomes.
This is complicated though: the goals specified for
complex endeavors are often vague, evolving, and even
paradoxical [5]. Crowdfunding campaigns are especially vulnerable to these challenges. The projects are
often early-stage and backers are less knowledgeable
and experienced than traditional investors are. This
makes it challenging to build a shared understanding for
specifying the goals – let alone balancing an appropriate
portfolio of incentives.
Information asymmetry is at the heart of incentive
misalignment, and information disclosure, thus, is valuable: detailed communication will make it difficult for a
principal to mislead an agent. The second, a voluntary
disclosure strategy, is especially powerful: managers
and insiders cannot hide information to obtain more
trust from financiers [17].
The manner in which creators make voluntary disclosures can vary though. For example, creators can
communicate via offline relationships or social media
[33]. Yet most crowdfunding campaigns take place on
platforms that act as shared spaces for different groups
of backers. Collectively, they rely heavily on information, and creators choose to provide it within the platform to evaluate projects [34]. Thus, it is unsurprising
that voluntary disclosure on crowdfunding platforms
may influence fundraising success (though excessive
disclosure may become problematic) [25].
The third is a feedback strategy for managing incentive misalignment. Feedback is a key component of
monitoring activities in agency relationships. It allows
the principal to express encouragement or dissatisfaction to the agent. This helps an agent gauge the intent
and priorities of the principal. And, it allows the agent
to judge the effectiveness of their communication and
respond to the principal in iterative negotiation [15].
Feedback appears especially important in crowdfunding environments for four reasons. First, the limited
monitoring activities available to backers mean they
must continuously request and validate information being exchanged [14]. Second, the community of backers
is likely to have a more diverse and unpredictable set of
interests than traditional investors [27], creating uncer-

6
For knowledge-intensive agents, such opportunities can create a link
between the tasks an agent is performing and their social identity. This
deepens the agency relationship, assuming the agent will continue to
perform the role in the future. Indeed, the goal of retaining an agent

tainty about those backers’ expectations. Third, individual crowd members often lack the knowledge of experts
[21]. So, they rely on collective judgments to spot problems. This informs their judgments of legitimacy with
observed feedback from other backers [12]. Fourth,
many backers attach themselves to projects because of
group identity, and this feedback enables shared meaning to be created [1].
A fourth means, the deferred compensation strategy,
incentivizes the agent to expend effort and not act opportunistically or selfishly. This is done by sharing the
costs of missing the principal’s goals (e.g., with delays)
[23], or sharing the benefits of meeting its goals (e.g.,
via firm or product performance) [34]. Signaling intent
is an important part of trust building in agency relationships, particularly in the early stage [8]. In addition to
signaling competency and honesty, new ventures often
wish to communicate strategic attitudes such as autonomy, competitive aggressiveness, and a willingness to
take risks [28].
Deferred compensation, thus, is a way for the principal to manage risk; and it is a way for the agent to
demonstrate confidence and commitment to long-term
outcomes. Deferred compensation can take many forms
but perhaps the most common includes developing additional long-term opportunities, such as career development [13]. 6 This deferred compensation is also evident in crowdfunding projects, whereby fundraising
may be affected by the perceived social identity of the
creator and continued engagement on the platform [36].

3. Context and methods
3.1. Research context: Kickstarter
We collected and analyzed data from the rewardsbased crowdfunding platform, Kickstarter. As of mid2020, US$5 bn was raised to fund more than 182,000
projects (www.kickstarter.com). When creators set up
their campaigns, they decide in which of Kickstarter’s
15 categories (Art, Fashion, Games, and Technology) to
launch them and set their funding goals. The latter indicates how much funding they need to move forward
with their project. Kickstarter follows an all-or-nothing
funding model, so only campaigns that reach the predefined funding threshold are considered to be successful
and receive the collected funds. If the threshold is not
reached, all backers will be reimbursed. Only about onethird of all its projects succeed.
Interactions among project creators and backers are
publicly visible. 7 We were able to trace them from a

can motivate offering deferred compensation.
7
For example, if a creator succeeds in collecting sufficient funding,
they must deliver on promises given to backers. The funding deadline
initiates a work-intensive time for creators when they stay in touch
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campaign’s launch until after rewards were to be delivered to backers. This high transparency makes Kickstarter the ideal context for studying the effects of incentive misalignment in reward-based crowdfunding. We
could observe funding success – the outcome that benefits creators most – as well as whether backers were satisfied with the rewards delivered to them.

3.2. Dataset
We gathered a time-series dataset with a self-developed web crawler that covers the period from the launch
of Kickstarter in April 2009 until April 2020. This initial
dataset includes all 470,000 projects that ran on Kickstarter during that period. We limited our dataset in several ways:
(1) We excluded campaigns that did not provide an estimated delivery date for any offered rewards. This
defines the start date for the period in which backers
expressed their satisfaction or dissatisfaction with
the rewards they were to receive. 8
(2) We eliminated campaigns canceled by the creator
or suspended for any reason by the platform.
(3) Nor did we include those with unavailable essential
information (e.g., project descriptions).
Our final dataset has 377,778 campaigns, out of
which 158,865 were successful. It contains basic information on all campaigns such as the funding goal, but
also the text of more than 20 mm comments written by
backers about these projects. (See Table 1. Descriptive
statistics are in Appendix Table A.)

3.3. Measures
Dependent variables. There are two. We use a dichotomous variable for funding success, indicating
whether a campaign has reached its funding goal. FundSucc is 1 if the project succeeded in reaching its funding
goal and 0 otherwise.
We measure BackerSatisf by evaluating the valence
of comments by backers indicating their satisfaction after the designated reward delivery date and for period of
up to 6 months after the final reward was supposed to be
delivered – the reward delivery period. A total of 5.6
mm comments were written by backers, an average of
15 comments per campaign (s.d. = 259). We examine
their sentiment of these comments using the Valence
Aware Dictionary and Sentiment Reasoner (VADER), a
sentiment analysis tool to analyze social media text. 9 To
obtain our measure, BackerSatisf, from VADER, we
with backers through Kickstarter and update them on progress toward
the delivery of rewards. In turn, backers can write to inquire about
project status, or deviations in the time of reward delivery.
8
Providing this information on Kickstarter was possible for creators
from August 1, 2011 onwards. We only included campaigns for which
we could observe a period of six months after the last rewards were
supposed to be delivered.

first derived a normalized weighted composite sentiment score for each of the 5.6 mm relevant comments. 10
We then took the average of these scores per campaign.
Table 1. Kickstarter’s campaign characteristics
Strategy
Contract
design
Feedback

Deferred
compensation

Info
disclosure

Controls

Variables
FundGoal
Duration
TimeDeliv
#Rewards
Backer comm
Backer senti
#Updates
BackedOthers
CreatorComm
PastProj
Authenticity
FBProfile
Video
#Images
Readability
SpellingErrors
#Words
NumTerms
Category
Year
US
StaffPick

Description
All-or-nothing project target ($)
# days for fundraising
# days before 1st rewards delivery
# different reward levels offered
# comments made by backers
Aggregate score for sentiments
# updates made by creator
# other projects creator backed
# comments by creator
# prior projects by creator on platform
Words to convey authenticity in descript.
Creator linked to Facebook profile (0/1)
Campaign had a video (0/1)
# images/videos in descript
Text readability in descript
Description contains spelling errors (0/1)
# words in the descript
Proportion numeric terms in descript
Project Kickstarter category
Year launched
Creator is located in the U.S. (0/1)
Platform has project on homepage (0/1)

Independent variables. Past research has examined
how different campaign characteristics predict backer
commitment during the fundraising process. Yet, despite the likelihood of incentive misalignment, the extent to which the same campaign characteristics predict
longer-term project outcomes remains unclear. We,
thus, performed a systematic literature review to ensure
our characteristics comparisons make sense.
We define the review scope as identifying and synthesizing the campaign characteristics connected with
fundraising in rewards-based crowdfunding. We further
conceptualize the topic as those campaign characteristics that are partially or totally visible to backers during
the fundraising process. Rather than exploring and interpreting the different qualities that vary according to project context, we also limit the focus to empirical studies
that perform quantitative analyses of multiple projects.
For our literature search process, we wanted to include
studies from a range of disciplines that had achieved a
high level of methodological scrutiny. We searched the
fifty journals included in the list provided by the Financial Times and used to rank international business
schools (the “FT50”). We limited our search for January

9
VADER matches text against 7,500+ words, acronyms and
initialisms as well as emojis – with sentiment polarity and intensity
scores that have been determined with the help of human raters. This
lexicon-based approached outperforms machine learning, especially
for shorter texts that can be found on social media.
10
This uni-dimensional measure of sentiment ranges between -1 (most
negative) and +1 (most positive).
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2010 to January 2020. 11 Search terms included keywords that could appear anywhere in an article (“crowdfunding” or “crowd funding”) and popular platform
names (“kickstarter” or “indiegogo”), in case empirical
studies of such platforms were performed in other research streams and the authors chose not to refer to the
platform type. This initially ‚produced 132 articles from
22 of the 50 journals. 12 We further harvested 63 articles
on rewards-based crowdfunding, but only 40 quantitative empirical studies of rewards-based crowdfunding
remained after more legitimacy checks. 13
The literature review and analysis used a conceptcentric matrix to identify and synthesize common campaign characteristics linked to fundraising. This resulted
in an initial set of 53 campaign characteristics with
demonstrated correlations with fundraising. In the interests of parsimony, these were refined to remove characteristics that met any of the following exclusion criteria
(1) they described qualities of the creator, often studied
to observe bias and prejudice (e.g. age, ethnicity) (2)
they were theoretical outliers that had not received
widespread attention (e.g. rhetorical signals, anonymity)
(3) they described the interaction between the campaign
and other social contexts. Each would have to be analyzed separately (e.g., by location, early contributions
from offline networks, social media interactions). This
resulted in 20 characteristics grouped by the four strategies identified for managing incentive alignment (contract design, information disclosure, feedback, and deferred compensation).
Campaigns capture contract design by specifying the
financial target as the collective investment required
over some specific period. This is important for contracts: connecting investment directly to outcomes is important to persuade investors to prioritize particular projects. Hence, contracts also include a number of rewards
which specify the different deliverables that individual
backers can expect. While the details of different rewards vary, the number of rewards can be used to indicate the breadth of commitments made to backers. The
timeline for the return of investment is also important in
contract design [3]. Campaigns may plan to deliver different rewards by different dates, and the amount of time
until their delivery is useful to assess project duration.
The manner in which campaigns capture feedback is
perhaps the straightforward to measure. First, campaigns can capture feedback via the number of com-

ments made during fundraising, which gives an indication of the amount of feedback and the willingness of
backers to provide it. Second, they capture its significance via the extent of positive or negative sentiments.
for encouragement or reproach [9].
Campaigns provide information disclosures and
capture deferred compensation in multiple ways. 14 First,
the creator’s participation in other projects shows longterm commitment to a community. This is indicated via
the number of previous projects they have created and
backed, or the number of comments they have left. This
is further indicated by the creator’s willingness to embed their personal identity in the project, by linking to a
Facebook account [18] or using authentic language [36].
The characteristics increase perceptions the creator will
have reputational benefits or costs from the project long
after the campaign has finished.
Control variables. We incorporated project-level
variables in our model to account for alternative explanations. First, dummy variables represent in which of
the 15 main categories on Kickstarter creators launched
their campaigns. Second, our dataset spans 2011 to
2019, so we included year dummies for when a campaign was launched to control for unobservable timevarying effects of changing platform dynamics. Third,
we coded for campaign location in the U.S. (US). Finally, when we estimated BackerSatisfaction, we also
included FundingPercentage, because raising more
funds than the target requires producing more rewards,
which explains why creators struggle with this process.

11

information is indicated by the word count in a campaign description,
while its depth is proxied by the proportion of numerical terms used.
The number of updates provides ongoing streams of campaign
information. And the ease that such information is understood is due
to project description readability (Flesch-Kincaid) and the presence of
spelling errors. Visual information, finally, is captured by the presence
of a video and number of images, which offer content cues.

This avoided studies when crowdfunding was still emerging.
50 articles removed were not focused on crowdfunding, another 10
focused on equity crowdfunding, 8 on P2P lending, and 1 on charity.
13
11 were non-empirical, 10 were on macro-impacts of crowdfunding
platforms, and another 2 were qualitative. All were screened out.
14
Due to space limitations, we suppressed citations on some variables
and measures well-known in crowdfunding research. The amount of
12

3.4. Estimation by linear probability methods
As our dependent variables are binary indicators, we
estimate linear probability models (LPMs), a special
case of the binary probability model. Though logit (logistic) and probit are standard for the analysis of binary
dependent variables, LPMs have distinct advantages in
our setting. Coefficients derived from logit and probit
regression cannot easily be compared between models
that differ in their dependent and independent variables.
They also have unobserved heterogeneity. We are interested in the signs and significance levels and comparing
them for the dependent variables, and LPMs are appropriate for interpreting such probability change results.
Thus, a coefficient can be interpreted as the change in
the probability that the dependent variable is equal to 1,
all else constant. We use heteroscedasticity-robust
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standard errors to avoid predicting out-of-range probability, such as p > 1 or p < 0.
We first estimated the LPM specification using
FundSucc (Model 1), and repeated it for the alternative
dependent variable by replacing dependent variable
with BackerSatisfact (Model 2). Besides the dependent
variable, the models only differed with regard to the
control variable for funding percentage, %Fund, that we
only included when the dependent variable was BackerSatisf. We checked the variance inflation factors (VIF)
for potential multicollinearity. All VIF values for our independent variables matched recommended threshold
values and mean VIF score requirements.
Fig 2. FundSucc and BackerSatisf, 2011-2019

4. Main Results
The number of campaigns per month varied on
Kickstarter between 2009 and 2019. (See Fig. 1) The
spike in 2014 is attributable to a policy change that removed the mandatory screening by Kickstarter before a
campaign’s launch. Since 2015, the number of campaigns per month has been declining and is now on a
similar level as it was in 2011.

Fig 1. Number of campaigns, 2011-2019

FundSucc and BackerSatisf fell until 2014, when
Kickstarter removed the mandatory campaign screening
policy. After this, FundSucc grew steadily from ~30%
to ~60% in 2019, while BackerSatis continued to decline, leading to a widening gap between both measures.
(See Fig. 2.) The incentive misalignment may be the
cause of these longer-term problems for Kickstarter, a
relationship that deserves further investigation.
We assessed significance of differences for coefficients of the main models with this general statistic [7]:
z = � βM1 - βM2 � �� 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆β2 + 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆β2
M1

15

M2

Since we do not use the robust SEs for estimating the changes in
the dependent variables, but only their differences (and page space is

The LPM results are shown in Table 2.
Table 2. LPM results for Models 1 and 2 (M1, M2)
VARIABLE

FundingSucc BackerSatisf
(M1)
(M2)

DIFF (z)

Contract design
FundGoal
-0.073***
0.003***
-123.58***
Duration
-0.002***
-0.000
-33.94***
TimeDeliv
-0.000***
-0.000***
10.202***
#Rewards
0.034***
-0.012***
29.383***
Information disclosure
Video
0.036***
0.003*
17.613***
#Images
-0.010***
-0.003***
-6.885***
Readability
-0.001***
-0.000
-18.788***
***
**
SpellErrors
-0.037
-0.005
-12.325***
#Words
0.008***
0.005***
3.486***
NumTerms
0.001***
0.001**
2.019***
Feedback
BackerComm
0.012***
0.002**
11.277***
BackerSentim
0.082***
0.006***
27.334***
Deferred compensation
#Updates
0.207***
0.003***
207.352***
BackedOthers 0.065***
0.008***
31.373***
CreatorComm 0.226***
-0.028***
96.293***
PastProj
0.006***
-0.003**
4.713***
Authenticity
-0.001***
0.000***
-17.085***
FBProfile
-0.017***
0.004***
-14.813***
Control variables
Category
Incl.
Incl.
–
Year
Incl.
Incl.
–
US (0/1)
0.004**
0.001
2.971***
StaffPick
0.099***
0.001
42.435***
%Fund
–
0.007***
–
Constant
0.765***
0.947***
–
R2
0.56
0.02
–
Obs.
377,778
158,865
–
Notes. *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1; robust SEs suppressed
due to space limitations.

Since FundSucc and BackerSatisf were scaled
equally, unstandardized β coefficients are compared.
The SE of the difference is the square root of the sum of
the two squared SEs. 15

limited), we chose to not present the SEs in Table 2, and we only discuss the β estimates and their significance levels in this section.
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Regarding the contract design, the first inherent misalignment between the goals of creators and backers is
evident from the opposing coefficients for funding goal.
Logically, the estimate of higher funding goals suggests
a lower probability of getting funded (βFundGoal_M1 = 0.073, p < 0.001), but also a higher probability for
backer satisfaction (βFundGoal_M2 = 0.003, p < 0.001). Opposing coefficients can also be observed for the number
of rewards offered. A higher number of rewards suggests a higher probability of funding (β#Rewards_M1 =
0.034), but also with a lower probability for backer satisfaction (β#Rewards_M2 = -0.012, p < 0.001).
For information disclosure, all coefficients align in
direction across the two models, indicating that these
signals do indeed help backers to discern the true quality
of the respective project. For instance, a campaign that
includes a video is more likely to get funded (βVideo_M1 =
0.036, p < 0.001) and also more likely to satisfy backers
(βVideo_M2 = 0.003, p < 0.05). Similarly, a longer project
description has the same positive effect for funding and
backer satisfaction, suggesting more detailed descriptions reduce the creator-backer information asymmetry.
Backer comments (BackComm) during the funding
period also potentially cause both a higher probability to
get funded (M1) and deliver more BackerSatisf (M2).
Table 3. Summary of misalignment between FundSucc
and BackerSatisf
VARIABLE
Funding Succ Backer Satisf
Contract design
FundGoal
+
Duration
○
#Rewards
+
Information disclosure
Readability
○
Deferred compensation
CreatorComm
+
PastProj
+
Authenticity
+
FBProfile
+

Finally, for deferred compensation, we again observed some opposing coefficients. For instance, if creators engage in a discussion with backers during the
funding period (by writing and responding to comments
of backers, this was observed to promote a higher probability of getting funded (βBackerComm_M1 = 0.226, p <
0.001), but a lower probability for backer satisfaction
(βBackerComm_M2 = -0.028, p < 0.001). Similarly, experienced creators who launched at least one project on
Kickstarter before were more likely to receive sufficient
funding, but less likely to satisfy their backers. Interestingly though, we observed the opposite effect if creators
16
We found that, based on research methods from Marketing (alternative market share estimation approaches) and Healthcare (patient
healthcare expenditure driven by insurance status), typically limited
dependent variables are preferred, but in Sociology (parental income

disclosed their Facebook profiles, which reduced their
probability to get funded (βPastProj_M1 = -0.017, p <
0.001), but increased the probability to eventually satisfy backers (βPastProjM2 = 0.004, p < 0.001).
5. Robustness Assessment
To check for the robustness of our results, we conducted further analyses. Though LPMs offer advantages
in our setting, especially cross-model coefficient comparisons and a binary variable (with a binomial datagenerating distribution), our main results may be biased
because the predicted values for the dependent variable
are not arrived at in the same manner as those for limited
dependent variable models. 16 Thus, we conducted additional robustness testing to see what issues arose, and
may affect the truth behind our estimates.
For our first check, we ran our analyses for FundSucc and BackerSatisf again, using a logit model (which
yielded pseudo-R2s of 0.56 and 0.06 for M1 and M2). 17
The results are consistent with those of the LPM in
terms of the direction and significance of coefficients
with one exception: the positive coefficient for PastProj
became negative in one model. Second, bias may have
arisen in our analysis because BackerSatisf was estimated on a partial dataset (i.e., all campaigns that were
successful and expected to deliver rewards to backers).
To reduce the overlap between the datasets for our
two models, we extracted two random samples of
100,000 campaigns and re-estimated the models. The
estimated coefficients from this robustness check
aligned with those of our main model for sign directions,
magnitudes, and significance levels with two exceptions. The effect for BackerSenti and PastProj lost significance in M1. Second, given the changing dynamics
on Kickstarter after the prescreening of campaigns was
discontinued in June 2014, we reran our models based
on a dataset with only campaigns launched after the policy change, so 110,323 campaigns were dropped. The
coefficients again were consistent with our main model,
with the exception of TimeDeliv, which became insignificant in M1 also. We conjecture that reframing this
research in a new quasi-experimental design that emphasizes causal inference may lead to resolution of the
conflicts and possible biases we observe.

6. Discussion
This study explored incentive misalignment in rewards-based crowdfunding. Using a large sample of
projects from Kickstarter, we compared whether the

effects on high school graduation) and Criminology (delinquent peers’
effects on young people’s incarceration), LPMs with binary dependent
variables are common and encouraged.
17
We discuss some possible reasons for M2’s weaker fit at the end.
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types of information involved with fundraising are also
linked to eventual backer satisfaction. Our results identified inconsistencies in these relationships and suggested this may be due to deteriorating platform participation – an unexpected observation. The findings thus
make several contributions to crowdfunding research.
First, many previous studies have explored the role
of campaign information in attracting funding. Crowdfunding exposes backers to disappointment though, due
to weak approximation of the legal contract from campaign information. To our knowledge, this is the first
study to connect the two literature streams at the campaign information level. This is a step toward explaining
agency relationships in rewards-based crowdfunding.
Second, we identified types of information that appear consistent and inconsistent. Some types of campaign information have a positive relationship with both
fundraising and eventual backer satisfaction. These
types are thought of as being connected with information disclosure and feedback. Other types have significant relationships with fundraising but not eventual
backer satisfaction, especially readability, funding duration, and staff picks. These relationships are difficult to
interpret, as the lack of significance may simply be a result of lower-value coefficients for backer satisfaction.
Most importantly though, we identified types of
campaign information that have opposing relationships
with fundraising and eventual backer satisfaction. Two
concern contract design: the number of rewards and the
funding target amount. These effects make sense when
we treat fundraising as a competitive process between
campaigns. If these campaigns amount to bidding for
backer contracts, then the creators must reveal their expected costs and willingness to share risk as agents.
More money for fewer rewards thus suggests creators
are allocating more time and money for each contingent
outcome. This is likely to increase the outcome quality
but decrease perceptions of efficiency with their “bids.”
The other types of information with opposing relationships with fundraising and eventual backer satisfaction concern deferred compensation. The number of past
projects by creators was positively related to fundraising
but negatively to eventual backer satisfaction. Meanwhile, the use of authentic language and a Facebook
profile were negatively related to fundraising but positively to eventual backer satisfaction. Consider the roles
of social identity and deferred compensation. From a
backer’s perspective, a creator signaling platform-specific identity suggests high loyalty and low likelihood of
defecting, magnifying the long-term benefits and gains.
Conversely, a creator signaling non-specific platform
identity may suggest low loyalty and a high likelihood
of defecting. Yet crowdfunding projects are fleeting by
nature on platforms like Kickstarter. This means longterm social connections between creators and backers

are generally reliant on connections and identities outside these platforms. Thus, signaling these non-specific
platform identities is actually more likely to magnify the
importance of deferred compensation obtained via reputational cost-benefit and emerging opportunities.
Finally, this study documents platform-level evidence that collective fundraising and collective backer
satisfaction have shifted to exhibit opposing trajectories.
Further, we found signs that this shift has coincided with
deteriorating participation by backers on Kickstarter.
Further analysis is required to unpack the nuances of
these platform-level patterns, as well as how they relate
to project-level incentive misalignment.

7. Conclusion
The main insight from this study is that rewardsbased crowdfunding may be unsustainable in its current
form in the market mechanism that we investigated. We
think this is true even though Kickstarter is one of the
most-recognizable crowdfunding platforms. Indeed, it
has established many of the fundraising dynamics for
this type of crowdfunding and launched many high-profile technology and art projects. Yet systemic issues in
its incentive structure seem to be contributing to a decline in campaign backers’ collective satisfaction, as
well as the number of projects getting funded on the
platform. Surprisingly, the observed decline in satisfaction and participation coincide with Kickstarter’s decision to lower restrictions on who can launch projects.
This casts doubt on the likely impact of crowdfunding
as an alternative channel in the future.
We contribute to research by: (1) by modeling creator-backer incentive alignment, as well as backer satisfaction – which represent a new empirical direction for
the crowdfunding literature; and (2) demonstrating that
it is possible to adopt an “inverse image” for empirical
analysis, and move away from the over-emphasis on
funds raised in crowdfunding projects. This will pave
the way, we assert, for new theoretical perspectives to
develop further enrich our knowledge in this area. The
addition of backer satisfaction is also important for studies of the macro-impacts of crowdfunding. Causal connections between regional trends and the number of
successful campaigns may be incomplete or even misleading without also modeling backers’ reactions to outcomes in geospatial terms – a methods advance opportunity.
We contribute to practice with three potential remedies to address possible deterioration of rewards-based
crowdfunding platforms. First, the platforms need to address the incentive misalignment at its core by adopting
staggered payment models. This is becoming more common outside of Kickstarter, as platform like Patreon introduce subscription-based models and equity platforms
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Projects like Star Citizen have used this approach to embed rewardsbased fundraising in their website, thus extending the funding period

and building an integrated community. Wikipedia also uses websiteembedded donation-style fundraising for its periodic funding calls.

use multiple (not single) funding rounds. Second, platforms may embed fundraising in other websites and social media used by creators. Creators will then be more
likely to experience the long-term reputational costs and
benefits related to with project outcomes. 18
Third, platforms may provide more explicit structure
as to what information creators should provide and how
backers can offer more effective input. This will encourage information disclosure by creators and feedback
from backers. Kickstarter has already added some of
these features that projects must include (in its “Risks
and Challenges” section) [24]. More could be done,
ranging from additional creator disclosure sections to
scheduled and automated backer polling.
Finally, we acknowledge several limitations in this
research. First, we focused on a single platform with a
disproportionately North American presence. So we
could not learn the extent to which backer satisfaction
may be affected by the extent of national regulation in
the U.S., or perhaps the cultural effects that may be present. Second, our models produced notably lower coefficients for backer satisfaction than for fundraising success. An explanation is that our model drew on literature
that aimed to find indicators that enhanced the likelihood of stronger fundraising, rather than backer satisfaction. Another reason, that backer satisfaction may be
dependent on more factors, expresses their impacts as
project development occurs over a longer period than
fundraising.
Third, perhaps sentiment analysis does not yield a
sensitive enough measure, so multiple methods can be
used to create and compare other backer satisfaction
measures. Fourth, this could be combined with other estimation techniques to examine temporal effects over
the course of individual projects. Fifth, we are also
working on quasi-experimental, causal-inference methods that enable innovative estimation and in-sample propensity-score matching methods to better align the datagenerating distributions for funding success and relate
to the backers’ characteristics [19, 35]. At the conference, we expect to share progress toward a research design that permits causal inferences that more strongly
support our findings.
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Appendix Table A. Descriptive statistics
VARIABLE
MEAN STD. DEV.
Dependent variables
FundSucc
0.421
0.494
BackerSatisf
0.965
0.183
Contract design
FundGoal†
8.549
1.691
Duration
33.093
11.574
TimeDeliv
86.072 104.045
#Rewards†
2.001
0.626
Information disclosure
Video
0.704
0.456
#Images †
1.244
1.263
Readability
63.457
13.203
SpellingErrors
0.090
0.287
#Words †
5.954
0.960
NumTerms
2.836
2.410
Feedback
BackerComm†
0.788
1.344
BackerSenti
0.208
0.317
Deferred compensation
#Updates†
1.096
1.122
BackedOthers
0.489
0.500
CreatorComm
0.162
0.369
PastProj
0.201
0.401
Authenticity
24.321
20.719
FBProfile
0.500
0.500
Control variables
US (0/1)
0.718
0.450
StaffPick
0.100
0.300
Notes. 377,778 campaigns; † = log value
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